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Abstract—Vehicular communication networks is a promising and 
emerging technology to facilitat road safety, Safety of life, traffic 
management, and infotainment dissemination for drivers and 
passengers. One of the ultimate goals in the design of such 
networking is to resist various malicious abuses and security 
attacks. In this research new security mechanisms are proposed to 
achieve secure certificate revocation, which is considered among 
the most challenging design objective in vehicular ad hoc networks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Traffic congestion is the most annoying thing that any 
driver in the world dreaming of avoiding it, a lot of traveling 
vehicles may cause problems, or facing problems that must be 
reported to other vehicles to avoid traffic overcrowding, 
furthermore, there are a lot of vehicles may send incorrect 
information, or a bogus data, and this could make the situation 
even worse.  
Recent research initiatives supported by governments and 
car manufacturers seek to enhance the safety and efficiency of 
transportation systems. And one of the major topics to search is 
"Certificate Revocation".  
Certificate revocation is a method to revoke some or all the 
certificates that the problematic vehicle has, this will enable 
other vehicles to avoid any information from those vehicles, 
which cause problems.  
Current studies suggest that the Road Side Unit (RSU) is 
responsible for tracking the misbehavior of vehicles and for 
certificate revocation by broadcasting Certificate Revocation 
List (CRL). RSU also responsible for the certificate 
management, communication with Certificate Authority (CA), 
warning messages broadcasting, communicating with other 
RSUs. Figure 1 shows a type of RSU, where Mercedes Benz 
suggests that it is a small unit will be hanged on the street 
columns, every 1 KM [1] according to DSRC 5.9 GHZ range. 
In vehicular ad hoc networks most of road vehicles will 
receive messages or broadcast sequence of messages, and they 
don’t need to consider all of these Messages, because not all 
vehicles have a good intention and some of them have an Evil-
minded. 
Current technology suffers from high overhead on RSU, as 
RSU tacking responsibility for the whole Vehicular Network 
(VN) Communication. Furthermore, distributing CRL causes 
control channel consumption, as CRL need to be transmitted 
every 0.3 second [2]. Search in CRL for each message received 
causes a processing overhead for finding a single Certificate, 
where VN communication involves a kind of periodic message 
being sent and received 10 times per second. 
This research proposes mechanisms that examine the 
certificates for the received messages, the certificate indicates 
to accept the information from the current Vehicle or ignore it; 
furthermore, this research will implement a mechanism for 
revoking certificates and assigning ones, these mechanisms will 
lead better and faster adversary vehicle recognizing. 
II. BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
Existing works on vehicular network security [3], [4], [5], 
and [6] propose the usage of a PKI and digital signatures but do 
not provide any mechanisms for certificate revocation, even 
though it is a required component of any PKI-based solution. 
In [7] Raya presented the problem of certificate revocation 
and its importance, the research discussed the current methods 
of revocation and its weaknesses, and proposed a new 
protocols for  certificate revocation including : Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL), Revocation using Compressed 
Certificate Revocation Lists (RC
2
RL), Revocation of the 
Tamper Proof Device (RTPD) and Distributed Revocation 
Protocol (DRP) stating the differences among them. Authors 
made a simulation on the DRP protocol concluding that the 
DRP protocol is the most convenient one which used the 
Bloom filter, the simulation tested a variety of environment 
like: Freeway, City and Mixing Freeway with City.  
In [8] Samara divided the network to small adjacent clusters 
and replaced the CRL with local CRL exchanged interactively 
among vehicles, RSUs and CAs. The size of local CRL is small 
as it contains the certificates for the vehicles inside the cluster 
only. 
In [9] Laberteaux proposed to distribute the CRL initiated 
by CA frequently. CRL contains only the IDs of misbehaving 
vehicles to reduce its size. The distribution of the received CRL 
from CA is made from RSU to all vehicles in its region, the 
problem of this method is that, not all the vehicles will receive 
the CRL (Ex: a vehicle in the Rural areas), to solve this 
problem the use of Car to Car (C2C) is introduced, using small 
number of RSU’s, transmitting the CRL to the vehicles. 
In [2] the eviction of problematic vehicles is introduced, 
furthermore, some revocation protocols like: Revocation of 
Trusted Component (RTC) and Leave Protocol are proposed.  
In [10] some certificate revocation protocols were 
introduced in the traditional PKI architecture. It is concluded 
that the most commonly adopted certificate revocation scheme 
is through CRL, using central repositories prepared in CAs. 
Based on such centralized architecture, alternative solutions to 
CRL could be used for certificate revocation system like 
certificate revocation tree (CRT), the Online Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP), and other methods where the common 
requirement for these schemes is high availability of the 
centralized CAs, as frequent data transmission with On Board 
Unit (OBUs) to obtain timely revocation information may 
cause significant overhead.  
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In order to improve the security of certificate revocation 
problem, new protocols for message checking and certificate 
revocation will be proposed, the amount of invalid messages 
from bad attitude vehicles must minimized.  
Message Checking: 
In this approach any vehicle receives a message from any 
other vehicle takes the message and check for the sender 
certificate validity, if the sender has a Valid Certificate (VC), 
the receiver will consider the message, in contrary, if the sender 
has an Invalid Certificate (IC) the receiver will ignore the 
message, furthermore, if the sender doesn’t have a certificate at 
all, the receiver will report to the RSU about the sender and 
check the message if it is correct or not, if the information 
received was correct RSU will give a VC for the sender, else 
RSU will give IC for it, and register the vehicle’s identity into 
the CRL. See figure 2 and 3 for the VC and IC structure, and 
figure 4 for message checking.  
 
 
Figure1. Road side unit 
 
Figure 2. Valid certificate 
IC will have the following fields: 
 
Figure 3. Invalid certificate 
These Certificates will not reserve much Memory like CRL 
does. 
 
Figure 4. Message checking procedure 
Certificate Revocation: 
Certificate revocation is done when any misbehaving 
vehicle having VC is discovered, where RSU replaces the old 
VC with new IC, to indicate that this vehicle has to be avoided 
and this happens when more than one vehicle reporting to RSU 
that a certain vehicle has a VC and broadcasting wrong data. 
See figure 5, this report must be given to RSU each time that 
any receiver receives information from sender and finds that 
this information is wrong. 
 
 Figure 5. Certificate revocation procedure 
The revocation will be as follows, a sender sen sends a 
message to receiver rec; this message may be from untrusted 
vehicle, so receiver sends Message to RSU to acquire Session 
Key (SKA), RSU replay message Containing SK Reply (SKR), 
this message contains the SK assigned to the current 
connection, this key is used to prevent attackers from 
fabrication of messages between the two vehicles.  
Receiver sends a message to check validity, this message 
called “Validity Message”, the message job is to indicate if the 
sender vehicle has a VC or not.  Afterwards, RSU reports to the 
rec that the sender has a VC, so receiver can consider the 
information from the sender with no fear.  
In some situations, receiver receives several massages, 
where all massages agree on a same result and same data, but a 
specific sender sends deferent data, this data will be considered 
as wrong data, if this data belongs to the same category. 
Every message will be classified depending on its category: 
TABLE I.  MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION AND CODING 
 
Every category has a code, if the message received has the 
same code of the other messages, and has a deferent data, then 
this message is considered as a bogus message. In this case rec 
sends an Abuse Report (AR) for RSU, the Abuse AR (sen id, 
Message Code, Time of Receive), this report will be forwarded 
to CA, if RSU receives the same AR from other vehicles 
located in the same area, the number of abuse Report messages 
depends on the vehicles density on the road, see figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Calculation of the Number of Vehicles in the Range [11]. 
If the number of vehicles that making accusation for a 
specific vehicle is near the half of the current vehicles, RSU 
will make a Revocation Request (RR) to revoke the VC from 
the sender vehicle. 
Some vehicles don’t produce an AR because they didn’t 
receive any data from the sender vehicle (maybe they weren’t 
in the area wile broadcasting), or they have a problem in their 
devices, or they have an IC, so RSU will not consider their 
messages. 
CA makes a revocation order to RSU after confirming the 
RR and updates the CRL and then RSU revokes the VC from 
the sender vehicle, and assigns IC for it, to indicate to other 
vehicles in the future, that this vehicle broadcasts wrong data, 
"don’t trust it". 
Figure 5 shows certificate revocation steps. 
The message sequence is as follows 
1-  sen          rec:ENCPK[Message + Sig] 
2-  rec           RSU:ENCPK [SKA + Sig] 
3-  RSU         rec: ENCPK [SKR + T + Sig] 
4-  rec          sen: ENCSK [VM + T + Sig] 
5-  sen          RSU:ENCPK [SKA + Sig] 
6-  RSU         sen: ENCPK [SKR + T + Sig] 
7-   sen         rec: ENCSK [VC + T + Sig] 
8-   rec          RSU: ENCPK [AbR + T + Sig] 
9-  RSU         CA: ENCPK [SN + RevReq + RevRea+ T + Sig 
+ senid + MesCod] 
10-  CA         RSU: ENCPK [SN + RevOr + UpCRL + T + Sig 
+ senid + RevRea]                                    
11-  RSU      sen: ENCPK [RevVC + AssBC + T + Sig + 
RevRea] 
Message 1: sen (sender) sends a message to the rec 
(receiver), this message along with digital signature of sen, and 
this message is encrypted with the Primary Key (PK) of rec.  
Any attacker can make a fabricated message telling rec that 
this message originated from sen, to prevent this signature from 
being used. 
Message 2: rec sends a request to RSU encrypted with the 
PK of RSU, acquiring a SK for securing connection.  
Message 3: replay for Message 2, contains the SK and the 
time for sending the replay, the importance of the time is to 
prevent replay attack, where an attacker can send this message 
more than once, with the same session key, and same signature, 
so he can forge the whole connection. 
Message 4: rec sends validity message to check if the 
vehicle has to be avoided or not, this message encrypted with 
the shared SK obtained from RSU.  
Message 7: sen sends a message to rec containing the VC, 
to report for rec that this vehicle must be trusted, and the time 
of sending, in here, to avoid reply attack, which happens when 
an attacker keeps the message with him, and sends it after a 
period, may be at that time, the senders certificate been revoked 
by RSU, so the sen must be avoided, but the attacker force the 
rec vehicle to trust it. After receiving the information, rec 
checks if the message has a deferent or same data for the same 
category of other messages received. 
Message 8: if the message is deferent, then, wrong data is 
received, rec sends an Abuse Report for RSU, contains sen id 
to know which vehicle made the problem, Message Code to 
know the category of the message, Time of Receive to know 
when the message received, and the message also includes the 
Time to avoid replay attack and Signature to avoid fabrication; 
the message is encrypted with PK of RSU. 
In this situation replay attack will happen, if an attacker 
copied this message, and sends it frequently to RSU in several 
times to make sure that the number of accusation reached a 
level, that the certificate must be revoked.  
After examining the number of vehicles that accused sen 
for sending an Invalid message, if the number is reasonable, 
RSU sends Message 9. 
Message 9: RSU sends RR for CA, containing Serial 
Number and Time to avoid replay attack and Signature to avoid 
fabrication, Revocation Reason to state what is the reason for 
revocation, and sen id to know which vehicle is the problematic 
one and message code to know what is the message category; 
the message is encrypted with PK of CA.  
Replay attack in this situation happens when an attacker 
wants to transmit the same message for CA claiming that this 
message is from RSU, after some time CA will not have the 
ability to respond, causing for DoS attack, so RSU must use 
Time and Serial number for this message, because CA has a lot 
of work to do and sending a lot of these kind of messages will 
cause a problem.  
Message 10: CA makes a Revocation Order for RSU; this 
message contains SN to avoid DoS Attack, time to avoid replay 
attack, signature to avoid fabrication attack, Sender Id, 
Revocation Reason to state what is the reason for revocation.  
After receiving this request CA will update CRL, adding 
the new vehicle that been captured to CRL and send it for RSU. 
DoS attack can happen, when attacker keep sending the 
same message to RSU, claiming that the message originated 
from CA, CA messages have the highest priority to be 
processed by RSU, so RSU will receive a huge amount of 
messages from CA and process it, without having the time to 
communicate with other RSUs or other vehicles, to avoid it a 
serial number and signature is used. 
Message 11: RSU makes the revocation, revoking VC, 
assigning IC, also this message contains the time to avoid 
replay attack, Signature to avoid fabrication attack, Revocation 
Reason to state what is the reason for revocation. 
However, RSU will be responsible for renewing vehicle 
certificates, any vehicle has an expiring certificate will 
communicate with RSU to renew the certificate, then the RSU 
will check the CRL to see if this vehicle has an IC or not. If 
there is no problem for giving a new certificate for this vehicle, 
it will be given for a specific life time, when the period expires 
vehicle will issue a request for the CA for renewing the 
certificate. VC will have a special design different from the 
design of X.509 certificate [12] as shown in figure 2 and 3. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
CRL is the most common mechanism for certificate 
revocation in VANET,  in [13] authors proposed that each 
vehicle must be stored with approximately 25000 certificates, 
and each certificate has 100 bytes, so, 2.5 mb is required to 
store the revocation data for one vehicle in CRL. By simple 
calculation the size of the CRL having 100 adversary vehicles 
might be 250 mb, and this is very large size to be broadcasted 
frequently for dense and high mobile network like VANET. 
The proposed mechanism would replace the old one, where 
the adversary vehicles would be identified by VC and IC 
certificates, so the size of the CRL will be reduced 90 % and 
this makes fast and efficient distribution and adversary 
recognition in VANET. 
V. CONCLUSION 
CRL is considered as the most common mechanism for 
adversary recognition in VANET which causes long delay, 
processing overhead and channel jamming. In this research 
new security mechanisms were proposed to achieve secure 
certificate revocation, which is considered among the most 
challenging design objective in vehicular ad hoc networks. 
The proposed mechanisms help vehicles to easily identify 
the adversary vehicle and make the certificate revocation for 
better certificate management.  
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